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Are sell-side analysts reluctant to go against the investment views of their hedge funds when 
these hedge funds are their prime brokerage clients? We show that prime broker analysts tend to 
upgrade stocks recently bought by their clients. For stocks with upgraded recommendations, 
post-announcement cumulative abnormal returns are significantly lower for those purchased by 
the prime brokerage clients. Our results are stronger with high-dollar-turnover clients who 
generate more trading commissions. We also find that a hedge fund with a large bet on a stock 
has a stronger incentive to pressure the fund’s prime brokers to issue a favorable 
recommendation on the stock. Results are not driven by stocks of firms with low analyst 
coverage or small size. 
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1. Introduction 
We explore the link between hedge funds and analysts via prime brokerage. In a post-
Spitzer era, Wall Street research departments can no longer share in the revenues from investment 
banking. Instead, anecdotal evidence suggests that sell-side analysts now cater increasingly to 
hedge funds which trade frequently and therefore generate the brokerage commissions and fees 
needed to sustain research.1 These fees include the lucrative charges for prime brokerage services. 
Prime brokerage is a bundled package of services offered by investment banks and securities firms 
to hedge funds. The services include financing to facilitate leverage, securities lending to facilitate 
short sales, global custody (clearing, custody, and asset servicing), customized technology to 
allow, for example, real time portfolio reporting, operational support, and capital introduction 
where the prime broker introduces qualified investors to the hedge fund.2 Prime brokerage is a big 
business for the investment banking industry, generating about $18.4 billion in revenues in 2015 
(Crowe, 2016). Given that the prime brokerage revenue was $10 billion in 2010 and that 
investment banking revenue was $12.9 billion in 2015, prime brokerage has become a major 
revenue source to brokers. Hedge fund assets also have been growing, from $2.2 trillion in 2012 
to $3.2 trillion at the end of 2017 (Williamson, 2018). With this outstanding growth in the assets 
                                                          
1 According to Amadeo (2019), about one-third of the total NYSE daily volume is done by hedge funds. Market 
observers have raised concerns that analysts are often reluctant to issue reports that go against the investment views 
of important institutional clients such as hedge funds (Unger, 2001). Prominent hedge funds, such as Steven Cohen’s 
SAC Capital Advisors, James Chanos’s Kynikos Associates, and Daniel Loeb’s Third Point, have been sued for 
allegedly conspiring with analysts to manipulate the prices of stocks in which they have built up large positions. In 
one such lawsuit, Biovail, a Canadian drug firm listed in New York and Toronto, claims that analysts published a 
negative report or “hatchet job” on Biovail at the behest of SAC, based on information provided by the hedge fund. 
See “Hedge Funds and Equity Research: Fair Comment or Foul?” The Economist, April 1, 2006, and “SEC Looks at 
Hedge Funds’ Trades,” The Wall Street Journal, February 13, 2009.  
 
2 The prime broker derives most of her revenues from fees or spreads on financing and lending, trading commissions, 
and fees for the settlement of transactions done away from the prime broker. 




managed by hedge funds, the prime brokerage business is expected to continue being important to 
brokers.  
The relationship between hedge funds and their prime brokers has been of interest in 
finance literature. For example, Chung and Kang (2016) and Gerasimova (2016) document 
positively correlated movement in the performance of hedge funds that use the same prime brokers. 
These papers suggest some sort of information sharing between hedge funds and their prime 
brokers. In fact, the popular press raises a concern that their relationship has become more like a 
partnership and too close.3 Such concerns stoke fears that analysts are subject to fresh conflicts of 
interest on top of the agency problems induced by investment banking and other trading 
commissions documented in the academic literature on sell-side analysts.4  
Motivated by these issues, we explore the relationship between hedge fund equity trades 
and the recommendations of analysts who work for the hedge fund’s prime brokers. We leverage 
on prime broker data that allow us to directly link individual hedge funds to analysts and test the 
influence of hedge funds that are prime brokerage clients of an analyst’s investment bank. We 
specifically ask the following: Do hedge fund stock purchases and sales impact the prime broker’s 
recommendation revisions? If so, are the upgraded recommendations following the stock purchase 
of hedge fund clients overly optimistic and biased? Are these results stronger for hedge funds that 
                                                          
3 See “Prime brokerage industry faces change,” Global Investor, April 2013. According to this article, “the leading 
prime brokers today want to expand the relationship with their clients to generate revenue from the firms' entire service 
offerings, not just traditional prime broker activities.” Also see “Hedge funds get ‘too cosy’ with prime brokers,” 
Financial Times, November 2013. 
4 Examples of work on investment banking–induced conflicts of interest include Dugar and Nathan (1995), Lin and 
McNichols (1998), Michaely and Womack (1999), and Kadan et al. (2009). For examples of work on trading 
commission–induced agency problems, see Irvine (2004), Jackson (2005), Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2006), 
Irvine, Lipson, and Puckett (2007), and Juergens and Lindsey (2009). 
 




generate more significant brokerage commissions? The answers will shed light on the agency 
issues confronting sell-side analysts in the aftermath of the Global Research Analyst Settlement. 
Our empirical analyses reveal that analysts are more likely to upgrade stocks purchased by 
their prime brokerage clients in the last quarter and downgrade stocks sold by the clients. If 
analysts are reacting to the same fundamental information as hedge funds albeit at a slow pace, we 
would also find the above results. However, the lead-lag relation between the stock trades of hedge 
funds and subsequent analyst recommendation revisions are only significant with the trades of 
hedge funds that are the prime brokerage clients of the analysts. The relation is not significant with 
the trades of the hedge funds that are not prime brokerage clients, which appears to eliminate the 
possibility of the alternative explanations. Furthermore, if analysts and hedge fund managers are 
using the same information sets, there is no reason that the recommendations revised one quarter 
after the client trades have information that is different from information in other revised 
recommendations. However, the recommendation revisions that are sympathetic to the trades of 
the prime brokerage clients in the last quarter, particularly recommendation upgrades, contain less 
information on future stock returns than other recommendation revisions.  
More specifically, we find that analysts’ recommendation upgrades impact the future three-
month and six-month returns in our sample. However, we find that the predictive power of the 
recommendation upgrades on the future abnormal returns becomes significantly weaker when the 
upgrades follow the client stock purchases. For stocks with upgrades to a Strong Buy 
recommendation, the top decile of stocks based on the change in the prime brokerage client 
holdings underperforms the bottom decile of stocks by and economically significant 3.9 percent 
(6.1 percent) during the three-month (six-month) post-recommendation announcement period. 




We also examine how the characteristics of each client hedge fund impact the association 
between the prime broker’s recommendation revisions in the current quarter and the client hedge 
fund trades in the last quarter. First, the sympathetic recommendation revisions appear driven by 
the desire among analysts to generate greater trading commissions from their clients. We find that 
analysts are more likely to issue recommendations consistent with the trades of high-dollar-
turnover clients than following trades of other clients. Second, clients themselves seem to pressure 
their prime brokers more to be sympathetic with their trades. We find that sympathetic broker 
recommendation revisions follow after client hedge funds take on large positions in a particular 
stock. Finally, we also find that trades by funds that are bigger, relative to the overall portfolio of 
the prime broker, result in more sympathetic recommendation revisions.  
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature on sell-side analysts and agency. 
Dugar and Nathan (1995), Lin and McNichols (1998), and Michaely and Womack (1999) show 
that an analyst from a brokerage house that has an underwriting relationship with a stock tends to 
issue more positive recommendations than analysts from non-affiliated houses.5 We show that an 
analyst from a brokerage house that has a prime brokerage relationship with a hedge fund tends to 
craft more sanguine reports on stocks bought by that fund than on stocks bought by other funds. 
Irvine (2004), Jackson (2005), and Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2006) present evidence that 
links analyst optimism to trade generation. In the presence of short sales constraints, optimistic 
recommendations by analysts encourage investors to trade through the analysts’ brokerages.6 Our 
                                                          
5  The optimism bias of investment banking–affiliated analysts has waned since the Global Research Analyst 
Settlement. Kadan et al. (2009) find that while these affiliated analysts are still reluctant to issue pessimistic 
recommendations on firms that they have an underwriting relationship with, they are now less likely to issue optimistic 
recommendations. 
6 Gu, Li, and Yang (2013) and Firth et al. (2013) show using Chinese data that Chinese mutual funds are able to 
leverage on brokerage commissions to influence sell-side analysts into issuing recommendations that are sympathetic 
to their investment views. 




results suggest that prime brokerage fees can also induce favorable analyst recommendation 
revisions about client trades. 
We also contribute to the literature on sell-side analysts and institutional investors. Irvine, 
Lipson, and Puckett (2007) and Juergens and Lindsey (2009) show that analysts reward 
institutional investors by revealing to them the contents of forthcoming reports. Our results 
indicate that analysts also reward prime brokerage clients by issuing recommendations that are 
sympathetic to their investment views. Ljungqvist et al. (2007) show that institutional investors 
exert a moderating influence on the bias of sell-side analysts. They argue that this is because 
institutional investors value unbiased research. After controlling for the trades of other institutional 
investors in our empirical work, we show that considerable cross-sectional heterogeneity among 
institutional investors exists in the context of their impact on analyst recommendations.  
Finally, we also make a contribution to the recently developing literature on prime brokers. 
One strand of this literature finds significant co-movement in returns across hedge funds that share 
a prime broker (e.g. Gerasimova, 2016; Chung and Kang, 2016), thereby suggesting some 
information sharing by the broker. Another strand further supports an information sharing channel 
between brokers and client hedge funds when entities (e.g. advisors, banks, underwriters, etc.) 
related to the broker have information about important corporate events (e.g. mergers (Goldie, 
2011), IPOs (Qian and Zhong, 2017), corporate loans (Kumar et al., 2020)). Aragon et al. (2020) 
even suggest investor preference for funds serviced by certain “connected” prime brokers. Our 
findings show that prime brokers actively cater to their connected hedge funds by issuing biased 
recommendation revisions to help their clients’ trades. In a way, this evidence of catering further 
cements the view that the prime brokers help their hedge fund clients by providing more than just 




trading services. Our evidence also reveals prime broker’s biased preference for hedge fund clients 
over other customers who pay for unbiased equity research.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data. Sections 
3 and 4 report the results from the empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes.   
 
2. Data 
Our dataset consists of the intersection of five databases: hedge fund prime brokerage data, 
the Thomson Financial 13F institutional database constructed from institutional investors’ 13F 
filings, the I/B/E/S database of research analyst recommendations, the Center for Research in 
Security Prices at Chicago (CRSP) stock data, and Compustat firm characteristics data. We obtain 
information on hedge funds and their prime brokers from the Barclayhedge, Hedge Fund Research, 
and the Lipper TASS union, which includes 31,798 funds. Of these, we drop data for the 20,471 
funds that stopped reporting returns by December 2010. While this decision likely introduces some 
survivorship bias in our data, it gives us stable sample of prime broker-hedge fund relationships 
which is crucial for our study. The prime broker information allows us to identify, for each hedge 
fund, the prime broker or brokers that service the fund. So that there are a sufficient number of 
hedge fund clients per prime broker, we confine the analysis to prime brokers who service at least 
ten hedge fund firms. As the data provide a snapshot of hedge fund prime brokers in 2010, we 
extend the time period by two years before and after 2010, implicitly assuming that hedge funds 
did not change their prime brokers between 2008 and 2012.7  This assumption is supported by the 
                                                          
7 We acknowledge that this choice probably introduces survivorship bias in our data, especially in the pre-2010 period. 
To the extent that that some hedge funds possibly switch prime brokers throughout our sample period, this choice 
results in us attributing some recommendation revisions by prime brokers to hedge fund incorrectly. So, this choice 
introduces noise to our analysis and makes it harder for us to obtain significant results. 




finding in Goldstein et al. (2009) that the relations between institutional client and prime brokers 
are remarkably sticky.   
We cull our main variable of interest, each prime broker’s hedge fund client equity trades 
(excluding short sales), from the Thomson Financial 13F institutional database. Institutions with 
more than $100 million in equities must report their equity ownership in quarterly 13F filings to 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The majority of institutions (such as pension 
funds, endowments, mutual funds, and hedge funds) are required to report equity positions in 
excess of ten thousand shares or $200,000 in market value for all firms traded on an exchange or 
quoted on the Nasdaq National Market System. The institutions report aggregate holdings for their 
firm, e.g., hedge fund family, regardless of how many individual fund portfolios they manage. 
Since each hedge fund’s stock holding data are not available, we use the stock holding data of 
these hedge fund families available in the Thomson Financial 13F institutional database. These 
institutional data certainly have a limitation for our analysis. An institution in the 13F data can 
have funds that are not hedge funds under its umbrella, and thus, the change in the aggregate 
holdings will not purely reflect the hedge fund trades. Hence, the use of 13F data requires an 
assumption that the change in the aggregate institutional holdings has a strong positive correlation 
with the hedge fund trades. Given that hedge funds are considered to be most frequent and active 
traders in the market, the change in the aggregate holdings will be mostly affected by the hedge 
fund trades, making this assumption likely valid. Furthermore, the non–hedge fund trades included 
in the change in the aggregate holdings will only work against finding significant results in our 
analyses.8        
                                                          
8 The Barclayhedge, Hedge Fund Research, and Lipper TASS union identifies 929 institutions having hedge funds 
under their umbrella in our sample period. Out of these institutions, 832 institutions are used in our final sample.  




During our sample period, the I/B/E/S dataset records 166,245 recommendations for 5,891 
unique companies made by 6,559 analysts at 509 brokerages. The Thomson Financial 13F database 
reports holdings data on 7,380 unique companies. The intersection of the five databases contains 
2,124 unique companies.9 I/B/E/S codes recommendations from one (Strong Buy) to five (Sell). 
As is standard in the literature, we reverse the order so that larger numbers indicate more favorable 
recommendations. One issue is that new, reiterated, or revised recommendations arrive and are 
recorded by I/B/E/S irregularly and relatively infrequently when compared with earnings forecasts. 
We therefore follow the algorithm outlined in Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston (2009) and Loh 
and Stulz (2011) to compute recommendation revisions.10  
Table 1 reports summary statistics on our data. It includes information on the size of the 
quarterly change in stock holdings of hedge funds that are prime brokerage clients, the change in 
non-client hedge fund holdings, the change in other institutional holdings, analysts’ 
recommendation revisions, stock market capitalization, stock book-to-market ratio, stock volume, 
and stock returns over the last six months, recommendation levels prior to the recommendation 
revisions, averaged across prime brokers, stocks, and quarters.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
                                                          
9 Since the large institutional investors and hedge funds with equity holdings in excess of $100 million that we analyze 
are unlikely to invest in penny stocks and other very small stocks, we omit stocks with prices below $5 from our 
sample. None of our baseline inferences change when we include these stocks in the analysis.  
 
10 Specifically, to compute the recommendation revisions, we follow those two studies and use a recommendation that 
has prior recommendation by the same analysts in the last one-year window. Newly initiated recommendations are 
eliminated because revision computation is not possible in such a case. When an analyst issues two recommendations 
at different dates, if the first recommendation has not been confirmed by the analyst in the one-year window before 
the second recommendation issuance, we consider the second recommendation a newly initiated recommendation. 
The I/B/E/S review data field shows whether or not an outstanding recommendation is confirmed by the analysts. 
Additionally, if an analyst issues a recommendation on a company and stopped covering it (based on the I/B/E/S 
Stopped File), and reissues another recommendation on the same firm company, we regard the second 
recommendation issuance as a re-initiation of the coverage and delete it.  





3. Empirical results 
3.1. Tests of analyst recommendation revisions 
Our first set of tests focuses on the effect of changes in hedge fund long equity positions 
on the recommendation revisions of analysts who work for the prime broker of the hedge fund. 
We ask whether the prime broker analysts of hedge funds are more likely to upgrade stocks 
purchased and downgrade stocks sold by hedge funds in the last quarter. Our tests control for the 
impact of purchases and sales by other hedge funds (excluding the prime brokers’ clients) and 
other institutional investors (excluding hedge funds) to understand the differential impact of client 
hedge funds versus other hedge funds and traditional asset management on the behavior of prime 
broker analysts. 
Other prior studies have examined analyst conflicts of interest using analyst earnings forecast 
optimism. However, investors often prefer positive earnings surprises. As shown in O’Brien 
(1988), this provides analysts an incentive to shade their earnings estimates so that the company 
can exceed the forecast. As a result, there are competing optimistic and pessimistic influences on 
analyst earnings forecasts. No such competing influences exist for analyst recommendations. 
Moreover, unlike earnings forecasts, analyst recommendations readily translate into a direct course 
of action for investors, that is, buy versus sell. Therefore, hedge funds are more likely to appreciate 
inflated recommendations, as opposed to optimistic earnings forecasts, on the stocks that they hold. 
Since it is easy to evaluate the accuracy of analyst forecasts by comparing the forecast estimates 
with actual earnings, the cost of a biased earnings forecast may also be greater than that of a biased 
recommendation. In line with this reasoning, Agrawal and Chen (2007) and Cowen, Groysberg, 
and Healy (2006) do not find evidence of investment banking–induced conflicts of interest when 




examining analyst earnings forecasts, while Irvine (2004) finds that analysts are more likely to 
respond to trading incentives through their recommendations than through biasing their earnings 
forecasts.   
The baseline OLS regression that we estimate can be expressed as follows: 
 
 ΔRECi,j,t = a + b ΔHCLIENTi,j,t-1 + c ΔNON_CLIENT_HEDGEi,j,t-1  
+ d ΔNON_HEDGEi,j,t-1 + e Log(ME) i,j,t-1 + f (BE/ME) i,j,t-2  
+ g LAG_RETURNi,j,t-1+ h VOLUMEi,j,t-1 + i LAG_RECi,j,t-1 + ɛi,j,t          (1) 
 
where ΔRECi,j,t is the change in the recommendation of the prime broker analyst i for a stock j in 
quarter t. ΔHCLIENTi,j,t-1 is the change in the sum of shares of a firm held by hedge funds that are 
prime brokerage clients of analyst i 's bank at quarter t-1. ΔNON_CLIENT_HEDGEi,j,t-1 is the 
change in the sum of shares of a firm held by hedge funds that are not prime brokerage clients of 
the analyst's bank at quarter t-1. ΔNON_HEDGEi,j,t-1 is the change in the sum of shares of a firm 
held by other institutional investors at quarter t-1 (excluding hedge funds). All three of these 
variables (ΔHCLIENT, ΔNON_CLIENT_HEDGE, and ΔNON_HEDGE) are scaled by the number 
of shares outstanding. In addition, for stock j,  is market equity,  is book-to-
market ratio, LAG_RETURNi,j,t-1 is past six-month buy-and-hold return, and  is daily 
volume scaled by shares outstanding and averaged over the last six months.  LAG_RECi,j,t is the 
prior recommendation level to the change in the recommendation of the prime broker analyst i for 
a stock j in quarter t.       
We control for the stock-specific variables to account for the potential impact of stock size 
on analyst recommendations and in response to Jegadeesh et al.’s (2004) findings that analysts 
generally recommend high-volume, extreme growth, and positive momentum stocks. The 
1, tjME 2,)/( tjMEBE
1, tjVOLUME




independent variables ΔNON_CLIENT_HEDGE and ΔNON_HEDGE cater for the possible 
moderating influence of other hedge funds that are not the prime brokerage clients and institutional 
investors who do not manage hedge funds (Ljungqvist et al., 2007). The accounting variable 
BE/ME is measured with a two-quarter lag following Jegadeesh et al. (2004). Other than the stock-
specific variables, we control for the prior recommendation level to the prime broker’s 
recommendation revision. If a prior recommendation was “Strong Buy,” the revision after the 
recommendation would be either reiteration of Strong Buy or downgrade. Likewise, if a broker’s 
recommendation before the revision was “Sell,” the revision is more likely to be an upgrade. The 
regressions include controls for broker fixed effects to allow for the possibility that the propensity 
of analysts to issue upgrades and downgrades differs systematically across brokers and quarter 
fixed effects to avoid the influence of quarter-specific factors on analysts’ recommendation 
revisions. The standard errors are clustered by firm to account for within-firm correlations in 
residuals.  
 In addition, we examine whether a prime broker analyst upgrades (or downgrades) the 
recommendation following the client stock purchase (or sales) with the following regressions: 
 
 UPGRADEi,j,t = a + b HCLIENT_BUYi,j,t-1 + c NON_CLIENT_BUYi,j,t-1  
+ d NON_HEDGE_BUYi,j,t-1 + e Log(ME) i,j,t-1 + f (BE/ME) i,j,t-2  
+ g LAG_RETURNi,j,t-1 + h VOLUMEi,j,t-1 + i LAG_RECi,j,t-1  + ɛi,j,t        (2) 
 
 DOWNi,j,t = a + b HCLIENT_SELLi,j,t-1 + c NON_CLIENT_SELLi,j,t-1  
+ d NON_HEDGE_SELLi,j,t-1 + e Log(ME) i,j,t-1 + f (BE/ME) i,j,t-2  
+ g LAG_RETURNi,j,t-1 + h VOLUMEi,j,t-1 + i LAG_RECi,j,t-1  + ɛi,j,t        (3) 
 




where  is an indicator variable that takes a value of one when analyst i upgrades 
stock j in quarter t, and a value of zero otherwise. HCLIENT_BUY i,j,t-1 is an indicator variable that 
is equal to one if ΔHCLIENTi,j,t-1 is positive, and is equal to zero otherwise. NON_CLIENT_BUYi,j,t-
1 is an indicator variable that is equal to one if ΔNON_CLIENT_HEDGEi,j,t-1 is positive, and is 
equal to zero otherwise. NON_HEDGE_BUY i,j,t-1  is an indicator variable that is equal to one if 
ΔNON_HEDGEi,j,t-1 is positive, and is equal to zero otherwise. DOWN, HCLIENT_SELL, 
NON_CLIENT_SELL, and NON_HEDGE_SELL are the analogous indicator variables for prime 
broker analyst downgrades, their prime brokerage client stock sales, other hedge fund stock sales, 
and other institution stock sales. Since we use indicator dependent variables in the model (2) and 
(3), logit regressions are estimated. Table 2 reports the results of the above regressions. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 The coefficient estimates on ΔHCLIENT, HCLIENT_BUY, and HCLIENT_SELL reported 
in columns (1), (2), and (3) of Table 2 are consistent with the view that prime broker analysts 
revise their recommendations in sympathy with the stock purchases and sales of their client hedge 
funds. Controlling for co-variation with other variables, the coefficient estimates on ΔHCLIENT, 
HCLIENT_BUY, and HCLIENT_SELL are all significantly positive at the one percent level. These 
results suggest that those prime broker analysts upgrade their recommendations on a firm one 
quarter after their client hedge funds purchased the stock, and downgrade their recommendations 
one quarter after their clients sold the stock.11  
                                                          
11 Irvine, Lipson, and Puckett (2007) and Juergens and Lindsey (2009) show that analysts reward institutional investors 
by “tipping” them up to five days before the public announcement date regarding the contents of their forthcoming 
reports. These institutional investors subsequently process their trades through the analysts’ brokerages. To investigate 
whether our results are driven by the prime broker’s sharing information immediately before recommendation changes, 
we impose a generous two-week gap between hedge fund trade date (i.e., quarter end) and the prime broker’s 
recommendation revision date. We find that recommendation revisions of prime brokers made more than two weeks 
after the prime brokerage client trades continue to be sympathetic to the investment views of the clients. Therefore, 
tjiUPGRADE ,,




Two explanations are possible for this finding. One explanation is that prime broker 
analysts upgrade their recommendations to maintain the price of a stock their clients purchased a 
quarter before and maintain the favorable recommendations until the clients unwind their 
positions. Another explanation is that, simply, both analysts and hedge funds are acting on the 
same information set, but hedge funds are faster in information acquisition than those prime broker 
analysts. Hence, it is important to investigate whether such a quarterly lead-lag relation exists 
between the change in the stock position of other hedge funds that are not the prime brokerage 
client and the prime broker recommendation revisions. We do not find such a relation in other 
hedge funds. The coefficient estimates on ΔNON_CLIENT_HEDGE and NON_CLIENT_SELL 
have negative signs. The coefficient estimate on NON_CLIENT_BUY is statistically insignificant. 
These results generally supports the first “conflict of interest” explanation.12  
For the other control variables, no significant association exists between prime brokers’ 
recommendation revisions and other non–hedge fund institutional investors (ΔNON_HEDGE and 
NON_HEDGE_BUY). The exception is NON_HEDGE_SELL in column (3). The coefficient on 
NON_HEDGE_SELL is significantly negative. The coefficients on Log(ME) and LAG_RETURN 
are significantly positive in columns (1) and (2) and negative in column (3), indicating that analysts 
                                                          
our results do not appear to be driven by prime brokers’ information sharing immediately prior to a recommendation 
change, as is usually the case in “tipping.”  Rather, our findings can only suggest that the broker analysts change their 
recommendations following the trade of the client funds. We, however, admit that it is not possible for us to 
comprehensibly test “tipping” of the prime broker to its hedge fund client in the absence of high-frequency data and 
communications between hedge fund clients and prime brokers closer to analyst recommendation changes.  
12 There is no study that directly compares the information acquisition and stock selection abilities of sell-side analysts 
with those of hedge funds, but Womack (1996) shows that sell-side analysts’ buy and sell recommendations embody 
valuable information. Conversely, Griffin and Xu (2009) document using hedge fund equity holdings that hedge funds, 
on average, do not possess stock selection skills. In addition, Griffin and Xu (2009) rarely find differential ability 
among hedge funds, while several prior studies show the differential ability among sell-side analysts (e.g., Hobbs, 
Kovacs, and Sharma 2012). Thus, it is difficult to presume that the whole body of sell-side analysts follows the stock 
selection of hedge funds.  




tend to upgrade their recommendations in large firms and stocks with favorable prior returns. 
Finally, as expected, the coefficients on LAG_REC are all significantly negative. Analysts are 
likely to upgrade their recommendations if their prior recommendation level is low and downgrade 
if their prior recommendation is high.   
  
3.2.  Tests of stock returns on recommendation revisions 
Having shown that prime broker analysts revise their recommendations following their 
client stock purchases or sales, we now turn to tests of stock returns to understand whether those 
revised recommendations following the client stock trades are biased. The test on post-
announcement stock returns will also allow us to distinguish from the information story, which 
predicts that the updated recommendations on stocks that the client purchased in the prior quarter 
should engender higher stock returns in the post-announcement period, as they are based on 
supposedly valuable information embedded in the change in hedge fund holdings.   
First, we examine the post-announcement returns following the recommendation revisions 
conditional on the client ownership changes in the previous quarter. We estimate regressions on 
abnormal stock returns after the recommendation revision announcement period, and analyze the 
impact of the interaction of the change in the client hedge fund holdings. Specifically, we run the 
following OLS regression: 
 
MARi,j,t = a + b ΔRECi,j,t  + c  ΔHCLIENTi,j,t-1 + d ΔRECi,j,t × ΔHCLIENTi,j,t-1  
+ d Log(ME) i,j,t-1    + f (BE/ME) i,j,t-2 + g LAG_RETURNi,j,t-1 + h ANALYSTi,j,t-1  
+ i ANALYSTi,j,t-1 × ΔRECi,j,t  + ɛi,j,t                 (4) 




where MAR is either 3MAR or 6MAR. The dependent variable 3MAR (6MAR) is three-month (six-
month) market-adjusted buy-and-hold stock returns measured starting two trading days after the 
recommendation revision announcement date; we use CRSP value-weighted index as the market 
benchmark (Brown and Warner, 1985). The rest of the variables are as defined previously. We 
control for size, book-to-market ratio, six-month lagged returns, and level of analyst following 
(see Banz, 1981; Fama and French, 1992; and Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993).13 We also include 
quarter fixed effects to control for time specific market characteristics and broker fixed effects to 
control for any time invariant broker characteristics. We also estimate a regression with 
UPGRADE and DOWN in place of ΔREC so as to explore the possible differential effect of the 
recommendation upgrade and downgrade.     
[Insert Table 3 Panel A here] 
The results from the stock return regressions are reported in Panel A of Table 3. The 
coefficient estimates on ΔREC is significant but that on the interaction variables (ΔREC × 
ΔHCLIENT) reported in column (1) of Panel A is not. So, ownership changes of the analysts’ 
prime brokerage clients do not seem to significantly impact the three- or the six-month future 
market-adjusted returns.  
Columns (3) and (4) report the regression results with UPGRADE. The coefficients on 
UPGRADE and UPGRADE × ΔHCLIENT are 0.047 (t-value: 3.40) and -0.004 (t-value: -2.38), 
respectively, with 3MAR. The magnitude of the coefficients is much larger than the coefficients in 
column (1) with ΔREC. Given that the standard deviation of the ΔHCLIENT is 2.102 (see Table 
                                                          
13 The regression equation (4) includes an interaction term between ANALYST and the change in recommendation 
variables. We do this to control for the effect that stocks with large analyst following might have on returns when the 
broker recommendations are changed at the same time by multiple brokers. We repeat these market-adjusted return 
regressions without the interaction and find that sign and significance of all variables are same without the interaction 
term. These results are available upon request. 




1), those coefficients suggest that one standard deviation change in ΔHCLIENT reduces the 
average three-month post UPGRADE announcement return by an economically significant 56% 
(2.102×0.004/0.015). Hence, the inference is that following analyst upgrade is not as profitable if 
the upgrade follows the stock purchase of the analyst’s prime brokerage clients. The coefficient 
on UPGRADE × ΔHCLIENT is also significantly negative in column (4) with 6MAR. The 
magnitude of the coefficient (-0.006; t-value: -2.15) is even larger than the coefficient on the 
interaction variable with 3MAR.14 Columns (5) and (6) show the regression results with DOWN. 
The coefficients on DOWN is negative and significant in both columns. The coefficient on DOWN 
× ΔHCLIENT are all insignificant. These insignificant results show that the prime broker’s 
recommendation downgrade following the client stock sales is not as biased as the upgrade 
following the client stock purchase.15     
                                                          
14 We also investigate how the stock position changes of other non-client hedge funds and other non–hedge fund 
institutional investors affect the post-announcement buy-and-hold abnormal returns of the revised recommendations 
by replacing ΔHCLIENT with ΔNON_CLIENT_HEDGE and ΔNON_HEDGE in the same regression model. In this 
revised regression model, the main variables of interest are UPGRADE ×ΔNON_CLIENT_HEDGE and UPGRADE 
×ΔNON_ HEDGE. None of these interaction variables are significant regardless of whether we use 3MAR or 6MAR 
as the dependent variable in the regression model. Thus, it is only the change in the stock position of the prime 
brokerage clients that affects the broker’s recommendation revision returns.    
15 In an untabulated analysis, we investigate stock returns during the recommendation announcement period to test 
whether investors de-bias the optimistic recommendations issued by analysts on stocks their prime brokerage clients 
purchased in the previous quarter. For prime brokerage clients to benefit from sympathetic analyst recommendations 
on the stocks that they recently purchased, it is a prerequisite that investors do not completely de-bias such favorable 
recommendation revisions. Specifically, we measure the cumulative market adjusted stock returns from one trading 
day before to one trading day after the recommendation revision announcement date (which are not included in the 
measurement of 3MAR and 6MAR), and use it as a dependent variable in the regression model (4). We find 
significantly positive coefficients on ΔREC and UPGRADE. These significant coefficients prove that analyst 
recommendation revisions significantly impact the market. However, we do not find any significant coefficient on the 
interaction variables (ΔREC × ΔHCLIENT and UPGRADE × ΔHCLIENT). Thus, investors do not de-bias the 
recommendations on stocks purchased by the analyst’s prime brokerage clients since information on each prime 
broker’s client equity position is not readily available in a timely fashion. 




We also estimate a regression with R_ΔHCLIENT in place of ΔHCLIENT so as to better 
evaluate the economic significance of our results. R_ΔHCLIENT is a decile-ranked variable of 
ΔHCLIENT scaled by nine. Since the decile-ranked variable takes values from zero to nine, 
R_ΔHCLIENT takes values between zero and one. We focus our analysis on UPGRADE because 
we get only significant results in UPGRADE in the previous table. 
 [Insert Table 3 Panel B here] 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3, Panel B report the result when R_ΔHCLIENT is interacted 
with UPGRADE. Although the coefficient estimates of the interaction variables are all negative, 
only the three-month return result is statistically significant (-0.022; t-value -2.09). From the 
viewpoints of client hedge funds, it will be the upgrade to Buy or Strong Buy recommendations 
that helps to maintain the price of the stocks they purchased. Thus, we create an indicator variable 
of one if the recommendation upgrade is to either Strong Buy or Buy, and zero otherwise 
(BUY_UP), and interact BUY_UP with R_ΔHCLIENT. The results are reported in columns (3) and 
(4) of Panel B. The coefficients on the interaction variables are -0.026 (t-value: -2.48) and -0.028 
(t-value: -2.01), respectively. The coefficient estimates in the 3MAR regression in column (3) 
indicate that three months after the announcement date, Strong Buy and Buy recommendations 
issued on the top decile of stocks in terms of the change in the stock holdings of prime brokerage 
clients underperform those issued on the bottom decile of stocks by 2.6 percent. We further 
investigate the case that the prime broker’s recommendation is upgraded to Strong Buy. The results 
are reported in columns (5) and (6) of Panel B. SBUY_UP is an indicator variable of one if the 
recommendation revision is an upgrade to Strong Buy, and zero otherwise. The coefficient 
estimates on the interaction variable (SBUY_UP × R_ΔHCLIENT) in column (5) and (6) are -0.039 
(t-value: -2.24) and -0.061 (t-value: -2.20). These results suggest that the three-month and six-




month return performances of the stocks upgraded to Strong Buy by the prime broker analyst are 
3.9 percent and 6.1 percent lower, respectively, in the top decile than in the bottom decile. These 
results suggest dismal performance for stocks with strong positive broker recommendations 
following larger client purchases.16  
 
3.3. Fund-level analyses 
In the previous section, we aggregate the stock positions of each prime broker’s clients and 
analyze how the change in this aggregate position influences the recommendations of the analysts 
who work for the clients’ prime broker on the assumption that the prime broker analysts feel 
pressure to revise their recommendations into the direction of the change in the aggregate 
position.17 We perform fund-level analyses in this section. That is, we examine how the change in 
the ownership of each fund affects its prime broker’s recommendation. One advantage of the fund-
level analysis is that it is easier to examine the effect of the fund characteristics (e.g., size of a 
                                                          
16 It is possible that the information in the recommendation revision is already incorporated in the returns before the 
revision.  This would be in line with the information sharing between broker and hedge funds (e.g. see Qian and 
Zhong, 2017; Kumar et al., 2020). To test this, we calculate the market adjusted returns from the beginning of the 
current quarter to the day before the prime broker analyst recommendation revision announcement. We then run 
regressions, similar to those presented in Tables 3, Panels A and B. We do not find any significant results supporting 
information sharing prior to the recommendation revision in these tests. While we cannot rule out other forms of 
information sharing around (e.g. about merger events, IPOs, etc. see Goldie (2011), Qian and Zhong (2017)), our 
evidence does not support a significant information sharing in regards to recommendation revisions.  
17 Our conjecture is that if a prime broker has five clients, and four clients buy a stock (that is, increase their long 
positions on the stock), while the fifth client sells the stock (that is, decreases its long position on the stock), analysts 
would be more likely to upgrade their recommendations to curry favor of the four clients unless the client who sells 
the stock is a much more important client than the other four hedge funds. 




fund) on the lead-lag relation between a fund’s stock trades and subsequent recommendation 
revision of its prime broker.18 
 
3.3.1. Baseline analyses 
First, we examine whether the quarterly lead-lag relation between the stock position change 
of a client hedge fund and the recommendation revision of its prime broker holds in the fund-level 
data. We replace ΔHCLIENT, HCLIENT_BUY, and HCLIENT_SELL in the regression models (1), 
(2), and (3) with ΔIND_HCLIENT, IND_HCLIENT_BUY, and IND_HCLIENT_SELL, 
respectively. ΔIND_HCLIENT is the change in the number of shares of a firm held by an individual 
hedge fund at quarter t-1 and scaled by the number of shares outstanding.19 IND_HCLIENT_BUY 
is an indicator variable that is equal to one if ΔIND_HCLIENT is positive, and is equal to zero 
otherwise. IND_HCLIENT_SELL is defined analogously. These results are shown in Table 4.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The coefficient on ΔIND_HCLIENT in column (1) of Table 4 is 0.029 (t-value: 3.83), 
which is 2.6 times the coefficient on ΔHCLIENT in Table 2. This is expected in that the average 
change in the ownership of each client fund is smaller than the average change in the aggregate 
                                                          
18 In untabulated results we run our analysis limiting our sample to the top 100 funds (based on size of portfolio) and 
repeat all tests represented in Tables 4 through 7. In doing so, we get results similar to those presented here, although 
coefficient estimates have higher magnitudes. These results are available upon request. 
19 In line with high trading volume and sudden changes in investment holdings typical of hedge funds (e.g. see Stulz, 
2007), we have outliers in our variable measuring individual stock positions held by client firms. To correct for these 
outliers in our fund-level sample, we winsorize the ΔIND_HCLIENT variable at 1% and 99% level.   




stock position of all the clients of a prime broker. Different from Table 2, we do not find significant 
coefficients on IND_HCLIENT_BUY or on IND_HCLIENT_SELL.20  
In the following sections, we investigate the effect of the fund characteristics on association 
between a fund’s stock trades and subsequent recommendation revision of its prime broker.  
 
3.3.2. Size of client funds 
The first fund characteristic we explore is the asset size of funds. In general, large funds 
have greater influence on sell-side analysts than small funds due to trading commission revenue 
from the large funds. According to Irvine (2004), brokerage commission revenue can affect analyst 
compensation. If the desire to generate trading commissions drives analyst behavior, then analysts 
may come under greater pressure to conform to the investment views of the clients with large fund 
size. Even if some large funds do not trade frequently, expectation from future trading 
commissions can be substantial. Hence, the trades of large funds may influence the 
recommendation of the analysts employed by the clients’ prime brokers more than trades of small 
funds.   
We examine how the equity portfolio size of a fund affects the association between hedge 
fund trades and the recommendation revisions of their prime brokers. We measure the sum of the 
dollar value of a client hedge fund’s stock portfolio at quarter t-1, and create an indicator variable 
of one if the sum is above the sample-median, and zero otherwise (FUND_SIZE). This indicator 
variable is interacted with the main variables of interest (ΔIND_HCLIENT, IND_HCLIENT_BUY, 
                                                          
20 In an untabulated test, the coefficient on IND_HCLIENT_BUY becomes statistically significant when we limit the 
sample to the largest 100 funds, indicating that buy decisions of bigger funds yield bigger influence on 
recommendation upgrades of the prime broker analysts. 




and IND_HCLIENT _SELL) in the baseline regressions to investigate the effect of size of client 
funds. Table 5 reports the regression results.   
[Insert Table 5 here] 
The interaction variables with ΔIND_HCLIENT and IND_HCLIENT_BUY are not significant. 
However, the coefficient on FUND_SIZE × IND_HCLIENT_SELL is significantly positive. This 
indicates that for large clients, their prime broker analysts tend to downgrade stock 
recommendations one quarter after the large clients unwind their positions on the stock. On 
average, it should take more time for large funds to unwind their positions without impacting the 
stock price than small funds. Thus, these large clients seem to pressure their prime brokers to 
downgrade a stock slowly when the clients are selling it.    
 
3.3.3. Dollar turnover of client funds 
In this section, we employ the actual dollar turnover of client funds as a conditioning 
variable in place of the size of the funds to explore the effect of trading commissions. Specifically, 
we measure the sum of the dollar value of the change in a prime brokerage client's stock holdings 
across all the firms at quarter t-1. As in the previous section, we create an indicator variable of one 
if the trading volume measured at t-1 is greater than the sample-median, and zero otherwise 
(TRADING_AMT). Then, we interact TRADING_AMT with ΔIND_HCLIENT, 
IND_HCLIENT_BUY, and IND_HCLIENT _SELL.    
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 6 report the regression results when we use UPGRADE and DOWN 
as dependent variables. The coefficients on the interaction variables (TRADING_AMT × 
IND_HCLIENT_BUY and TRADING_AMT × IND_HCLIENT_SELL) are both positive and 




significant. The interaction term between TRADING_AMT and ΔIND_HCLIENT, as shown in 
column (1), is not significant. The categorical decision to upgrade or downgrade thus appears to 
be more sensitive to the trading amount of the client fund. These results also suggest that the 
positive lead-lag association between the trades of hedge funds and their prime brokers’ 
recommendation revisions documented in Table 2 is, in fact, mostly driven by the high-dollar-
turnover funds.  
     
3.3.4. Client’s stock position and portfolio 
If hedge funds pressure their prime brokers to revise the recommendations in line with their 
recent trades, a hedge fund that has a large bet on a stock would more pressure on its prime broker 
to issue revise recommendation to suit the client. Performance of this stock must be crucial to the 
fund’s overall performance. Another probable factor that might influence the prime broker and 
hedge fund relation is the degree of concentration of clients that a prime broker has – a broker with 
many small clients might feel less pressurized to revise recommendations than another one with a 
few large clients. To explore these two conjectures regarding the client-broker relation, we perform 
the following two tests.  
First, we measure the ratio of the dollar value of a client's investment in a specific stock 
relative to the dollar value of the same fund’s overall stock portfolio at quarter t-1. The higher this 
ratio, the more important the stock is to the client. Then, as in Tables 5 and 6, we perform a test 
with an indicator variable of one if this ratio is above the sample-median, and zero otherwise. We 
name this indicator variable LARGE_BET. If our view that hedge funds pressure their prime 
brokers more to get a favorable recommendation on a stock with a relatively large position is true, 




we will find a significantly positive coefficient on the interaction variable between 
ΔIND_HCLIENT and LARGE_BET in the regression.  
[Insert Table 7, Panel A here] 
Panel A of Table 7 reports the regression results. In column (1), we do not find a significant 
coefficient on the interaction variable (LARGE_BET × ΔIND_HCLIENT), but when the dependent 
variable is UPGRADE in column (2), the coefficient estimate on LARGE_BET × 
IND_HCLIENT_BUY is significantly positive (0.066, t-value 2.72). It appears that clients with a 
large bet on a stock exert influence on the prime broker analysts to revise the recommendation 
upward after the client stock purchase.  
The coefficient estimate on the interaction variable LARGE_BET × IND_HCLIENT_SELL 
in column (3) is not significant. This insignificant result in column (3) is, in a sense, expected. 
LARGE_BET is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if a client has over the sample-
median concentrated bet in a stock relative to the client’s overall portfolio at quarter t-1, and zero 
otherwise. Thus, in the observations with LARGE_BET being one, clients still have a large 
ownership in a firm at quarter t-1 regardless of whether the clients purchase the stock additionally 
or sell it in the same quarter. If a client purchased a stock and ends up with a concentrated bet on 
the stock at quarter t-1, the client will pressure its prime brokers to upgrade the recommendations 
to support the stock price. However, if a client sells a stock at quarter t-1 but still has a large 
ownership in the stock (LARGE_BET being one), the client would not pressure the prime brokers 
to downgrade the stock.  
For the second test exploring the client-broker relationship, we use a different variable. 
Instead of measuring how large a particular stock position is in a client’s own portfolio, we 
measure the importance of a particular hedge fund client to a prime broker. To capture the relative 




importance of a hedge fund to a prime broker, we calculate the weight of a hedge fund in the 
broker’s overall portfolio, CLIENT_WT, by dividing the dollar value of a hedge fund’s stock 
portfolio by the sum of the values of all hedge fund stock portfolios associated with a prime broker.  
This variable takes a high value for relatively large funds at a prime broker and low values for 
smaller funds, thus capturing the relative importance of funds to a broker. We measure this for 
every fund that a prime broker has, based on a client hedge fund's stock portfolio at quarter t-1. 
Panel B of Table 7 reports the regression results with CLIENT_WT.  
[Insert Table 7 Panel B here] 
The coefficient estimate on CLIENT_WT × ΔIND_HCLIENT in column (1) is not statistically 
significant, but the coefficient estimates on CLIENT_WT × IND_HCLIENT_BUY   and 
CLIENT_WT × IND_HCLIENT_SELL are significant in columns (2) and (3), with values of 0.036 
(t-value: 1.85) and 0.059 (t-value: 3.10), respectively. This indicates that a prime-broker is more 
likely to upgrade (downgrade) a stock if a relatively important client buys (sells) that stock in the 
prior quarter. These results suggests that the likelihood of a recommendation revision in line with 
the client’s trade increases as the relative size of the hedge fund increases. 21 
 
                                                          
21 In untabulated results, we also investigate if the hedge fund characteristics influence the relation between hedge 
fund portfolio changes, broker recommendation revisions and future stock returns (beyond what we show in Table 3 
results). For these tests, we interact fund characteristics investigated in the section 3.3 (e.g. size of the fund, trading 
volume in the prior quarter, large bet on a particular stock, and CLIENT_WT) with the prime broker’s change in 
recommendation variables, and add these interaction variables in the return regression similar to those in Table 3. For 
the most part, fund characteristics do not appear to significantly influence these results. TRADING_AMT is the only 
fund-characteristic variable that loads with a significantly negative coefficient in some on the interaction variables 
(and only when the broker issues a strong-buy recommendation revision). This result shows that only the equity trading 
from hedge funds with large trading volumes significantly modifies the relationship between broker’s 
recommendation revisions and the future stock returns documented in Table 3. These results are available upon 
request. 




4. Stock characteristics 
It is difficult for large hedge funds to move in and out of small capitalization stocks without 
moving prices. Therefore, small stocks tend to be less interesting to hedge funds with significant 
assets under management. At the same time, our results will be less meaningful if they were 
confined to stocks that are rarely covered by analysts. To check that our findings are not confined 
to small capitalization and low analyst coverage stocks, we split the sample of firms equally by 
median market capitalization and analyst coverage, and re-estimate the regressions in Table 2. 
Panel A of Table 8 reports the regression results in small versus large firms, and Panel B present 
the results in low versus high analyst following firms. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
The coefficient estimates on ΔHCLIENT, HCLIENT_BUY, and HCLIENT_SELL in Panel A 
indicate that our findings are not primarily driven by small stocks; coefficient on ΔHCLIENT and 
HCLIENT_SELL are significant in both groups while HCLIENT_BUY is marginally significant (t-
value of 1.71) for small stocks while insignificant for large stocks (t-value of 1.54). In Panel B, we 
still find positive and significant coefficients on ΔHCLIENT and HCLIENT_SELL in both low and 
high analyst following firms. The exception is HCLIENT_BUY. We only find a significant 
coefficient on HCLIENT_BUY in the sub-sample where analyst following is high – interestingly, 
higher analyst following creates an opening for hedge funds in line with the interpretation of 
influence over analysts.  
 
5. Conclusion 




This paper leverages prime broker data to directly link analysts to hedge funds and 
marshals empirical evidence to suggest that the prime brokers of hedge funds issue 
recommendations that empathize with the investment views of the prime brokerage clients. The 
behavior of stock returns after recommendation revision announcements suggests that the 
recommendation upgrades on stocks purchased by the prime brokerage clients are overly 
optimistic. Compliant analysts appear driven by the desire to generate trading commissions 
included in prime brokerage fees. The results are stronger for high-dollar-turnover hedge funds 
that generate significant trading commissions for prime brokers. Prime broker analysts are more 
likely to upgrade their stock recommendations on stocks purchased by the clients that have a large 
investment bet on a stock in the last quarter. Results do not appear to be driven solely by stocks of 
small firms or by firms that have a small analyst following. These results serve as a reminder that 
in a post-Spitzer era, even though the research departments at Wall Street have been weaned off 
investment banking revenues, they must still contend with prime brokerage fee–induced conflicts 
of interest till true unbundling and separate pricing of analyst research and brokerage services is 
achieved. We leave to future research whether the European Union led directives around Markets 
in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) or the eventual adoption of similar laws in the US 
markets will change the relationship between hedge fund clients and their prime brokers.22 
    
                                                          
22 The US Securities and Exchange Commission has allowed a “no-action relief” to US brokers from several key 
aspects of directives associated with the European Union led MiFID (II) related unbundling provisions and fee 
payments till July 3, 2023. To gauge the range of options that the SEC is considering, see the submitted comments, 
available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/mifidii/mifidii.htm. Also see Fang et al. (2020) for early evidence on the 
effect of MiFID (II) unbundling on coverage of European firms.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics  
This table reports descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study. ΔREC is the change in a prime 
broker analyst recommendation. ΔHCLIENT is the change in the sum of shares of a firm held by hedge 
funds that are prime brokerage clients of the analyst's bank at quarter t-1. ΔNON_CLIENT_HEDGE is the 
change in the sum of shares of a firm held by hedge funds that are not prime brokerage clients of the 
analyst's bank at quarter t-1. ΔNON_HEDGE is the change in the sum of shares of a firm held by other 
institutional investors at quarter t-1 (excluding hedge funds). All these variables are scaled by the number 
of shares outstanding at quarter t-1. ME (in $ millions) is the market value of equity measured at the end of 
quarter t-1. BE/ME is the ratio of book value at quarter t-2 to market value of common equity measured at 
the end of quarter t-2. LAG_RETURN is six-month buy-and-hold returns ending in quarter t-1. VOLUME 
is the daily volume scaled by shares outstanding (in percentage) and averaged over the six months preceding 
the end of quarter t-1. LAG_REC is the level of an individual recommendation prior to the change in an 
analyst’s recommendation (ΔREC). 3MAR is the three-month market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns 
measured starting two trading days after the recommendation revision announcement date and using the 
CRSP value-weighted index as the market benchmark (Brown and Warner, 1985). Similarly, 6MAR is the 
six-month market-adjusted returns measured starting two trading days after the recommendation revision 
announcement date. ANALYST is the log value of one plus number of analyst following a firm at the end 
of quarter t. UPGRADE is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the recommendation revisions (ΔREC) 
is an upgrade, and is equal to zero otherwise. DOWN is an indicator variable that is equal to one if ΔREC 
is a downgrade, and is equal to zero otherwise.  
 




       
ΔREC  18,699  -0.049 1.196 -1.000 0.000 1.000 
ΔHCLIENT  18,699  -0.025 2.102 -0.370 0.000 0.430 
ΔNON_CLIENT_HEDGE  18,699  -0.390 4.824 -1.716 0.007 1.524 
ΔNON_HEDGE  18,699  0.518 7.433 -2.118 0.361 3.088 
ME (in $ millions)  18,699  12,312 28,799 1,587 3,969 11,684 
BE/ME  18,699  0.556 0.500 0.287 0.467 0.738 
LAG_RETURN  18,699  0.030 0.459 -0.182 0.006 0.184 
VOLUME  18,699  14.896 12.114 7.744 11.642 18.365 
LAG_REC  18,699  3.362 0.866 3.000 3.000 4.000 
3MAR  18,458  0.015 0.194 -0.083 0.007 0.099 
6MAR  18,458  0.031 0.291 -0.117 0.009 0.142 
ANALYST  18,458  2.584 0.595 2.303 2.708 2.996 
UPGRADE  18,458  0.345 0.475 0.000 0.000 1.000 
DOWN  18,458  0.387 0.487 0.000 0.000 1.000 
       
 




Table 2: Regressions on the recommendation revisions of prime broker analysts 
This table reports results from regressions on the recommendation revisions of prime broker analysts. The 
dependent variables are ΔREC, UPGRADE, and DOWN. The dependent variables are measured in quarter 
t. The independent variables include the following: HCLIENT_BUY is an indicator variable that is equal 
to one if ΔHCLIENT is positive, and is equal to zero otherwise. NON_CLIENT_BUY is an indicator 
variable that is equal to one if ΔNON_CLIENT_HEDGE is positive, and is equal to zero otherwise. 
NON_HEDGE_BUY is an indicator variable that is equal to one if ΔNON_HEDGE is positive, and is equal 
to zero otherwise. HCLIENT_SELL, NON_CLIENT_SELL, and NON_HEDGE_SELL are defined 
analogously. All other variables are defined in Table 1. OLS regression is estimated for ΔREC. Logit 
regressions are estimated for UPGRADE and DOWN All specifications use quarter and broker fixed 
effects; reported z-statistics and t-statistics are clustered by firm. The ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. Main variables of interest are in bold.  
  Dependent variables 
 ΔREC UPGRADE DOWN 
 (1) (2) (3) 























































Log(ME) 0.083*** 0.218*** -0.230*** 
 (13.86) (11.40) (-12.89) 
BE/ME -0.026 -0.103 0.002 
 (-1.02) (-1.24) (0.03) 
LAG_RETURN 0.089*** 0.254*** -0.426*** 
 (3.52) (3.86) (-5.34) 
VOLUME -0.000 0.005** 0.003 
 (-0.14) (2.17) (1.46) 
LAG_REC -0.985*** -2.842*** 2.433*** 
 (-105.74) (-49.21) (53.44) 
Constants 2.869*** 6.923*** -7.891*** 
 (38.80) (25.25) (-25.19) 
    




Observations 18,699 18,698 18,698 
Adjusted/Pseudo R-Square 0.497 0.440 0.390 








Table 3: Regressions of recommendation revisions on stock returns  
This table reports regressions results explaining market adjusted returns after the announcement of 
recommendation revisions by prime brokers of fund clients. Panel A presents the results when ΔHCLIENT 
(continuous variable) is used as a main independent variable. Panel B presents the regression results when 
R_ΔHCLIENT (ranked variable) is used as a main independent variable. R_ΔHCLIENT is the decile ranked 
variable of ΔHCLIENT divided by nine so that R_ΔHCLIENT ranges from zero to one. BUY_UP is an 
indicator variable of one if the recommendation upgrade is to either Strong Buy or Buy, and zero otherwise. 
SBUY_UP is an indicator variable of one if the recommendation revision is an upgrade to Strong Buy, and 
zero otherwise. All other variables are as defined in Table 1. All specifications use quarter and broker fixed 
effects; reported t-statistics are clustered by firm. The ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10 levels, respectively. Main variables of interest are in bold. 
Panel A: ΔHCLIENT (continuous variable) as main independent variable 
 Dependent variables 
  3MAR 6MAR 3MAR 6MAR 3MAR 6MAR 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
ΔREC 0.019*** 0.019**     
 (3.52) (2.34)     
ΔREC × ΔHCLIENT -0.001 -0.001     
 (-1.51) (-1.13)     
UPGRADE   0.047*** 0.031   
   (3.40) (1.48)   
UPGRADE × ΔHCLIENT   -0.004** -0.006**   
   (-2.38) (-2.15)   
DOWN     -0.043*** -0.043* 
     (-2.86) (-1.84) 
DOWN × ΔHCLIENT     0.001 0.002 
     (0.38) (0.94) 
ΔHCLIENT -0.002** -0.003** -0.001 -0.001 -0.002** -0.004** 
 (-2.55) (-2.28) (-0.69) (-0.66) (-2.10) (-2.22) 
Log(ME) -0.010*** -0.016*** -0.010*** -0.016*** -0.010*** -0.016*** 
 (-5.97) (-5.96) (-6.00) (-5.99) (-5.96) (-5.94) 
BE/ME 0.004 0.010 0.003 0.010 0.004 0.010 
 (0.55) (0.71) (0.54) (0.70) (0.55) (0.70) 
LAG_RETURN -0.008 -0.018* -0.008 -0.018* -0.008 -0.018*  
(-1.21) (-1.92) (-1.22) (-1.92) (-1.22) (-1.92) 
ANALYST 0.009** 0.009 0.014*** 0.012 0.004 0.003  
(2.31) (1.32) (3.14) (1.61) (0.93) (0.47) 
ΔREC ×ANALYST -0.006*** -0.007**     
 (-3.10) (-2.24)     
UPGRADE ×ANALYST   -0.014*** -0.009   
   (-2.71) (-1.15)   
DOWN × ANALYST     0.013** 0.015* 
     (2.46) (1.80) 
Constant 0.067*** 0.139*** 0.050*** 0.128*** 0.084*** 0.155*** 




 (4.89) (5.66) (3.45) (4.94) (5.59) (6.00) 
Observations 18,458 18,458 18,458 18,458 18,458 18,458 
Adjusted R-square 0.022 0.026 0.022 0.026 0.022 0.026 
       
 
Panel B: R_ΔHCLIENT (ranked variable) as main independent variable 
 Dependent variables 
  3MAR 6MAR 3MAR 6MAR 3MAR 6MAR 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
UPGRADE 0.058*** 0.043*     
 (3.95) (1.93)     
UPGRADE × R_ΔHCLIENT -0.022** -0.023     
 (-2.09) (-1.54)     
BUY_UP   0.037** 0.030   
   (2.26) (1.26)   
BUY_UP × R_ΔHCLIENT   -0.026** -0.028**   
   (-2.48) (-2.01)   
SBUY_UP     0.009 0.020 
     (0.41) (0.56) 
SBUY_UP × R_ΔHCLIENT     -0.039** -0.061** 
     (-2.24) (-2.20) 
R_ΔHCLIENT -0.004 -0.010 -0.009* -0.015* -0.010** -0.016** 
 (-0.59) (-1.05) (-1.71) (-1.93) (-2.01) (-2.12) 
Log(ME) -0.010*** -0.016*** -0.010*** -0.016*** -0.010*** -0.016*** 
 (-6.00) (-5.99) (-6.02) (-5.98) (-5.90) (-5.94) 
BE/ME 0.004 0.010 0.004 0.010 0.004 0.010 
 (0.54) (0.70) (0.58) (0.70) (0.57) (0.71) 
LAG_RETURN -0.008 -0.018* -0.008 -0.017* -0.008 -0.017* 
 (-1.21) (-1.90) (-1.17) (-1.86) (-1.16) (-1.88) 
ANALYST 0.014*** 0.012 0.010** 0.010 0.008** 0.009  
(3.15) (1.61) (2.44) (1.38) (2.13) (1.26) 
UPGRADE × ANALYST -0.014*** -0.009     
 (-2.70) (-1.14)     
BUY_UP × ANALYST   -0.006 -0.004   
   (-1.04) (-0.56)   
SBUY_UP × ANALYST     0.004 0.003 
     (0.51) (0.25) 
Constant 0.052*** 0.133*** 0.066*** 0.143*** 0.073*** 0.149*** 
 (3.48) (5.02) (4.51) (5.48) (5.07) (5.85) 
Observations 18,458 18,458 18,458 18,458 18,458 18,458 
Adjusted R-squared 0.022 0.026 0.021 0.026 0.021 0.026 








Table 4: Regressions of the change in individual client stock holdings on prime broker 
recommendation revisions (fund-level analysis) 
This table reports results from regressions of the change in the individual client's stock holding on the 
recommendation revisions of the prime broker analysts. ΔIND_HCLIENT is the winsorized, at 1% at both 
tails, change in the number of shares of a firm held by an individual hedge fund that is a prime brokerage 
client of the analyst's bank at quarter t-1 and scaled by the number of shares outstanding. 
IND_HCLIENT_BUY is an indicator variable that is equal to one if ΔIND_HCLIENT is positive, and is 
equal to zero otherwise. IND_HCLIENT_SELL is defined analogously to capture the sell. All other 
variables are as defined in Table 1. OLS regression is estimated for ΔREC. Logit regressions are estimated 
for UPGRADE and DOWN. All specifications use quarter and broker fixed effects; reported z-statistics and 
t-statistics are clustered by firm. The ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. Main variables of interest are in bold. 
 Dependent variables 
 ΔREC UPGRADE DOWN 
  (1) (2) (3) 
        
ΔIND_HCLIENT 0.029***   
 (3.83)   
ΔNON_CLIENT_HEDGE -0.001   
 (-0.64)   
ΔNON_HEDGE 0.001   
 (0.45)   
IND_HCLIENT_BUY  -0.011  
  (-0.88)  
NON_CLIENT_BUY  0.030  
  (0.46)  
NON_HEDGE_BUY  0.079  
  (1.13)  
IND_HCLIENT_SELL   -0.008 
   (-0.74) 
OTHER_HEDGE_SELL   -0.051 
   (-0.83) 
NON_HEDGE_SELL   -0.160** 
   (-2.45) 
Log(ME) 0.086*** 0.239*** -0.238*** 
 (14.26) (10.29) (-9.63) 
BE/ME 0.012 -0.032 -0.111 
 (0.60) (-0.40) (-1.56) 
LAG_RETURN 0.127*** 0.252*** -0.666*** 
 (3.57) (2.82) (-4.11) 
VOLUME 0.001 0.007*** 0.002 
 (1.09) (2.68) (0.97) 
LAG_REC -0.869*** -2.644*** 2.387*** 
 (-82.11) (-38.05) (42.08) 
    




Constant 2.454*** 5.919*** -8.088*** 
 (33.32) (18.59) (-20.34) 
Observations 403,994 403,994 403,994 
Adjusted/Pseudo R-Square 0.446 0.377 0.334 
    
 
  




Table 5: Regressions on recommendation revisions stratified by client size (fund-level 
analysis)  
This table reports the effect of the client fund size on the lead-lag relation between the change in the hedge 
fund client ownership and the prime broker's recommendation revision. FUND_SIZE is an indicator 
variable of one if the sum of the dollar value of a prime brokerage client's stock holdings across all the firms 
measured at quarter t-1 is above sample-median, and zero otherwise. All other variables are as defined in 
Table 1. OLS regression is estimated for ΔREC. Logit regressions are estimated for UPGRADE and 
DOWN. All specifications use quarter and broker fixed effects; reported z-statistics and t-statistics are 
clustered by firm. The ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Main variables of interest are in bold. 
 Dependent variables 
 ΔREC UPGRADE DOWN 
  (1) (2) (3) 
        
ΔIND_HCLIENT 0.049***   
 (2.91)   
FUND_SIZE × ΔIND_HCLIENT -0.024   
 (-1.27)   
ΔNON_CLIENT_HEDGE -0.001   
 (-0.64)   
ΔNON_HEDGE 0.001   
 (0.45)   
IND_HCLIENT_BUY  -0.020  
  (-1.20)  
FUND_SIZE × IND_HCLIENT_BUY  0.031  
  (1.48)  
NON_CLIENT_BUY  0.030  
  (0.46)  
NON_HEDGE_BUY  0.079  
  (1.13)  
IND_HCLIENT_SELL   -0.033** 
   (-2.10) 
FUND_SIZE × IND_HCLIENT_SELL   0.040** 
   (2.17) 
OTHER_HEDGE_SELL   -0.051 
   (-0.83) 
NON_HEDGE_SELL   -0.160** 
   (-2.44) 
FUND_SIZE -0.016*** -0.069*** 0.021* 
 (-6.94) (-5.81) (1.87) 
Log(ME) 0.085*** 0.235*** -0.235*** 
 (14.11) (10.13) (-9.56) 
BE/ME 0.012 -0.032 -0.111 
 (0.59) (-0.40) (-1.56) 
LAG_RETURN 0.127*** 0.252*** -0.665*** 
 (3.57) (2.82) (-4.10) 




VOLUME 0.001 0.007*** 0.002 
 (1.04) (2.62) (1.00) 
LAG_REC -0.869*** -2.645*** 2.387*** 
 (-82.14) (-38.07) (42.09) 
Constant 2.469*** 5.978*** -8.115*** 
 (33.60) (18.77) (-20.45) 
Observations 403,994 403,994 403,994 
Adjusted/Pseudo R-Square 0.446 0.377 0.334 
    
 
  




Table 6: Regressions on recommendation revisions stratified by turnover in client portfolio 
(fund-level analysis)   
This table reports the effect of the client dollar turnover on the lead-lag relation between the equity trades 
of the hedge fund clients and the prime broker's recommendation revisions. TRADING_AMT is an 
indicator variable of one if the sum of the dollar value of the change in a prime brokerage client's stock 
holdings across all the firms measured at quarter t-1 is above sample-median, and zero otherwise. All other 
variables are as defined in Table 1. OLS regression is estimated for ΔREC. Logit regressions are estimated 
for UPGRADE and DOWN. All specifications use quarter and broker fixed effects; reported z-statistics and 
t-statistics are clustered by firm. The ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. Main variables of interest are in bold. 
 
Dependent variables 
 ΔREC UPGRADE DOWN 
  (1) (2) (3) 
ΔIND_HCLIENT 0.033*   
 (1.69)   
TRADING_AMT × ΔIND_HCLIENT -0.005   
 (-0.22)   
ΔNON_CLIENT_HEDGE -0.001   
 (-0.64)   
ΔNON_HEDGE 0.001   
 (0.45)   
IND_HCLIENT_BUY  -0.036**  
  (-2.15)  
TRADING_AMT × IND_HCLIENT_BUY  0.054***  
  (2.64)  
NON_CLIENT_BUY  0.030  
  (0.46)  
NON_HEDGE_BUY  0.079  
  (1.13)  
IND_HCLIENT_SELL   -0.039** 
   (-2.37) 
TRADING_AMT × IND_HCLIENT_SELL   0.059*** 
   (3.05) 
OTHER_HEDGE_SELL   -0.051 
   (-0.83) 
NON_HEDGE_SELL   -0.160** 
   (-2.44) 
TRADING_AMT -0.006*** -0.057*** -0.024** 
 (-2.96) (-4.94) (-2.27) 
Log(ME) 0.085*** 0.236*** -0.238*** 
 (14.17) (10.15) (-9.63) 
BE/ME 0.012 -0.032 -0.111 
 (0.59) (-0.40) (-1.56) 
LAG_RETURN 0.127*** 0.252*** -0.666*** 




 (3.57) (2.82) (-4.10) 
VOLUME 0.001 0.007*** 0.002 
 (1.07) (2.64) (0.96) 
LAG_REC -0.869*** -2.644*** 2.387*** 
 (-82.11) (-38.06) (42.08) 
Constant 2.461*** 5.967*** -8.075*** 
 (33.37) (18.70) (-20.32) 
Observations 403,994 403,994 403,994 
Adjusted/Pseudo R-Square 0.446 0.377 0.334 
    
  
  




Table 7: Regressions on recommendation revisions stratified by client’s oversized stock 
position and broker’s concentration (fund-level analysis)  
These tables report the effect of the size of the client position in a stock relative to the client’s overall 
portfolio (Panel A) and prime brokers’ client diversification level (Panel B) on the lead-lag relation between 
the change in the hedge fund client ownership and the prime broker's recommendation revision. 
LARGE_BET is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the ratio of the dollar value of a hedge 
fund client's stock holding in a firm relative to the dollar value of its overall stock portfolio measured at 
quarter t-1 is above sample-median, and zero otherwise. CLIENT_WT is the hedge fund client’s portfolio 
weight in the broker’s overall portfolio of clients, calculated as the value of a client’s portfolio, in dollars, 
divided by the total portfolio value of a prime broker measured at quarter t-1. All other variables are defined 
in Tables 1 and 4. Panel A presents the regression results when LARGE_BET is used as a main cross-
sectional variable. Panel B presents the regression results when CLIENT_WT is used as a main cross-
sectional variable. OLS regression is estimated for ΔREC. Logit regressions are estimated for UPGRADE 
and DOWN. All specifications use quarter fixed effects; specifications in Panel A also uses broker fixed 
effects; reported z-statistics and t-statistics are clustered by firm. The ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. Main variables of interest are in bold. 
Panel A: LARGE_BET as main conditioning variable 
 Dependent variables 
  ΔREC UPGRADE DOWN 
  (1) (2) (3) 
    
ΔIND_HCLIENT -0.000   
 (-0.02)   
LARGE_BET × ΔIND_HCLIENT 0.029   
 (1.41)   
ΔNON_CLIENT_HEDGE -0.001   
 (-0.63)   
ΔNON_HEDGE 0.001   
 (0.44)   
IND_HCLIENT_BUY  -0.066***  
  (-3.15)  
LARGE_BET × IND_HCLIENT_BUY  0.066***  
  (2.72)  
NON_CLIENT_BUY  0.031  
  (0.47)  
NON_HEDGE_BUY  0.079  
  (1.12)  
IND_HCLIENT_SELL   -0.009 
   (-0.57) 
LARGE_BET × IND_HCLIENT_SELL   0.003 
   (0.13) 
OTHER_HEDGE_SELL   -0.051 
   (-0.83) 
NON_HEDGE_SELL   -0.163** 




   (-2.50) 
LARGE_BET 0.012*** 0.015 -0.042*** 
 (3.12) (0.86) (-2.72) 
Log(ME) 0.085*** 0.236*** -0.234*** 
 (14.03) (10.12) (-9.41) 
BE/ME 0.012 -0.028 -0.108 
 (0.60) (-0.35) (-1.51) 
LAG_RETURN 0.126*** 0.252*** -0.657*** 
 (3.53) (2.83) (-4.00) 
VOLUME 0.001 0.007*** 0.002 
 (1.08) (2.67) (0.99) 
LAG_REC -0.870*** -2.648*** 2.390*** 
 (-82.21) (-38.12) (42.09) 
Constant 2.457*** 5.953*** -8.122*** 
 (33.28) (18.67) (-20.37) 
Observations 396,743 396,743 396,743 
Adjusted/Pseudo R-Square 0.447 0.378 0.335 
        
 
 
Panel B:  CLIENT_WT as main conditioning variable 
  Dependent variables  
 ΔREC UPGRADE DOWN 
 (1) (2) (3) 
        
ΔIND_HCLIENT 0.031*   
 (1.91)   
CLIENT_WT × ΔIND_HCLIENT -0.006   
 (-0.31)   
ΔNON_CLIENT_HEDGE -0.001   
 (-0.57)   
ΔNON_HEDGE 0.000   
 (0.37)   
IND_HCLIENT_BUY  -0.034**  
  (-2.09)  
CLIENT_WT × IND_HCLIENT_BUY  0.036*  
  (1.85)  
NON_CLIENT_BUY  0.022  
  (0.37)  
NON_HEDGE_BUY  0.065  
  (1.03)  
IND_HCLIENT_SELL   -0.023 
   (-1.41) 
CLIENT_WT × IND_HCLIENT_SELL   0.059*** 
   (3.10) 




OTHER_HEDGE_SELL   -0.047 
   (-0.81) 
NON_HEDGE_SELL   -0.147** 
   (-2.31) 
CLIENT_WT 0.081*** 0.185*** -0.248*** 
 (13.81) (8.57) (-9.93) 
Log(ME) 0.012 -0.054 -0.123* 
 (0.60) (-0.84) (-1.86) 
BE/ME 0.127*** 0.261*** -0.611*** 
 (3.50) (3.11) (-4.06) 
LAG_RETURN 0.001 0.006*** 0.002 
 (1.06) (2.64) (0.88) 
VOLUME -0.842*** -2.344*** 2.136*** 
 (-83.34) (-32.69) (47.36) 
LAG_REC 0.025*** 0.100*** -0.018 
 (8.13) (7.10) (-1.37) 
Constant 1.889*** 4.542*** -5.200*** 
 (26.51) (15.02) (-17.87) 
Observations 403,994 403,994 403,994 
Adjusted/Pseudo R-Square 0.430 0.305 0.286 
        
 
  




Table 8: Regressions on recommendation revisions stratified by firm size and number of 
analysts following 
These tables report results from regressions on the recommendation revisions of the prime broker analyst 
by firm size and number of analysts following. Panel A presents the regression results in small versus large 
firms. SMALL (LARGE) firms are below (above) median market capitalization of sample firms. Panel B 
presents the regression results in firms with low versus high number of analyst following. LOW (HIGH) 
ANALYST FOLLOWING represent below (above) median number of analysts following sample firms. 
All variables are as defined in Table 1. OLS regression is estimated for ΔREC. Logit regressions are 
estimated for UPGRADE and DOWN. All specifications use quarter and broker fixed effects; reported z-
statistics and t-statistics are clustered by firm. The ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10 levels, respectively. Main variables of interest are in bold.  
Panel A: Regression results by firm size 
  SMALL FIRMS LARGE FIRMS 
 ΔREC UP DOWN ΔREC UP DOWN 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
ΔHCLIENT 0.012***   0.010**   
 (3.43)   (2.40)   
ΔNON_CLIENT_HEDGE -0.001   -0.004   
 (-0.79)   (-1.55)   
ΔNON_HEDGE 0.001   0.002   
 (0.58)   (1.11)   
HCLIENT_BUY  0.106*   0.098  
  (1.71)   (1.54)  
NON_CLIENT_BUY  0.020   -0.013  
  (0.29)   (-0.19)  
NON_HEDGE_BUY  0.018   0.043  
  (0.26)   (0.59)  
HCLIENT_SELL   0.220***   0.187*** 
   (3.76)   (3.25) 
OTHER_HEDGE_SELL   -0.129**   -0.129** 
   (-2.10)   (-2.13) 
NON_HEDGE_SELL   -0.158**   -0.085 
   (-2.57)   (-1.28) 
Log(ME) 0.092*** 0.281*** -0.243*** 0.092*** 0.232*** -0.239*** 
 (6.85) (6.31) (-5.95) (7.19) (5.55) (-6.53) 
BE/ME -0.059*** -0.203*** 0.069 0.031 0.062 -0.106 
 (-3.15) (-3.06) (1.11) (0.79) (0.59) (-0.80) 
LAG_RETURN 0.075*** 0.203*** -0.336*** 0.113** 0.366*** -0.641*** 
 (3.77) (2.94) (-4.66) (2.23) (3.12) (-2.95) 
VOLUME -0.000 0.004* 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.003 
 (-0.31) (1.83) (1.15) (0.20) (0.99) (0.82) 
LAG_REC -0.955*** -2.597*** 2.367*** -1.019*** -3.191*** 2.555*** 




 (-79.58) (-37.01) (41.48) (-72.40) (-32.67) (33.48) 
Constant 2.703*** 5.998*** -7.503*** 2.898*** 7.629*** -8.371*** 
 (23.21) (13.75) (-16.62) (20.08) (15.34) (-15.16) 
Observations 9,346 9,343 9,346 9,353 9,352 9,352 
Adjusted/Pseudo R-Square 0.482 0.408 0.387 0.514 0.482 0.399 
       
 
Panel B: Regression results by the number of analyst following 
 LOW ANALYST FOLLOWING HIGH ANALYST FOLLOWING 
 ΔREC UP DOWN ΔREC UP DOWN 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
ΔHCLIENT 0.012***   0.009**   
 (3.40)   (2.36)   
ΔNON_CLIENT_HEDGE -0.002   -0.003   
 (-0.99)   (-1.45)   
ΔNON_HEDGE 0.002   0.000   
 (1.22)   (0.24)   
HCLIENT_BUY  0.086   0.134**  
  (1.35)   (2.15)  
NON_CLIENT_BUY  0.023   -0.015  
  (0.34)   (-0.21)  
NON_HEDGE_BUY  0.059   0.015  
  (0.87)   (0.20)  
HCLIENT_SELL   0.254***   0.149** 
   (4.46)   (2.56) 
OTHER_HEDGE_SELL   -0.155**   -0.129** 
   (-2.53)   (-2.12) 
NON_HEDGE_SELL   -0.137**   -0.117* 
   (-2.27)   (-1.72) 
Log(ME) 0.080*** 0.211*** -0.233*** 0.089*** 0.219*** -0.268*** 
 (9.17) (7.42) (-8.65) (8.86) (6.72) (-9.14) 
BE/ME -0.017 -0.031 -0.016 -0.034 -0.222** 0.039 
 (-0.56) (-0.36) (-0.16) (-1.15) (-2.08) (0.47) 
LAG_RETURN 0.062*** 0.202*** -0.331*** 0.173*** 0.404*** -0.553*** 
 (2.82) (2.77) (-3.41) (4.46) (3.22) (-4.48) 
VOLUME 0.001 0.005* -0.001 -0.001 0.004 0.004 
 (1.08) (1.91) (-0.28) (-0.61) (0.97) (1.43) 
LAG_REC -0.956*** -2.640*** 2.341*** -1.017*** -3.113*** 2.582*** 
 (-76.30) (-36.74) (40.80) (-76.41) (-33.02) (36.71) 
Constant 2.742*** 6.438*** -7.205*** 2.982*** 7.694*** -8.485*** 
 (27.05) (16.99) (-18.40) (25.12) (17.39) (-17.13) 
Observations 9,269 9,269 9,269 9,365 9,364 9,364 
Adjusted/Pseudo R-Square 0.481 0.418 0.380 0.514 0.469 0.406 
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